Idealismekredsens blog

2 kommentarer

1. Jacob\:

   Gode idealister!

   Efter samtale med Stuart fredag aften interesserer mig en passage i Proposition 8, Scholium 2, mao. den alternative demonstration af substansens nødvendige eksistens. Bortset fra det problematiske i det ontologiske substansbevis (proposition 7), samt i hele ideen om en substans, som er årsag til sig selv, søger Spinoza her at demonstrere, at der kun kan være én nødvendigt eksisterende substans, idet man ikke kan udlede noget antal af substanser blot fra substansens natur. Men er det da ikke lige fejlagtigt herfra at ville udlede, at der kun eksisterer én substans? Er antallet én ikke lige så lidt indeholdt i substansens definition som antallet tyve?

   Stuart pointerede tillige, at man udfra en idealistisk (Kant/Fichte) subjektopfattelse ikke kunne redegøre for eksistensen af et bestemt antal subjekter (kan man det fra en Spinozistisk opfattelse?). Nu er subjekt jo ikke substans for idealister og falder derfor ikke naturligt under kategorien kvantitet, men subjektet er dog bundet tillige til individualitet og ikke blot til den alméne transcendentale konstitution. Ligger der et potentielt problem for idealismen heri?
   mvh J\

   22 september 2008, 2:08 pm

2. Stuart:

   Kære alle!

   Tak for sidst! I really enjoyed my first idealist meeting, and I hope I didn’t bore you all too much with my ‘inadequate ideas’ of Spinoza…

   I think Jacob fairly summarises the point I was trying to make last week at Rasmus’ place (in fact I think he is being very generous on my behalf, given the amount of Belgian beers I drank that evening!). Anyway, to elaborate a little further, I think that despite the obvious problems with Spinoza’s arguments, which Jacob and others convincingly pointed out at the meeting on Tuesday, I still feel that he at least gives us an account of singularity and how we can come to think of subjectivity as being transcendental in the first place. This is not primarily a question of number, although this is perhaps how the problem is most readily seen. The question rests rather more on whether transcendental subjectivity can account for genesis and individuation. That is, if the sense and manner in which we (come to) exist has no effect on the way or conditions in which we experience the world and think, then where precisely does this transcendental subjectivity come from? From a Nietzschean perspective we could say that it has arisen through certain repetitive techniques which connected series of singularities into internal regularities (a folding of affects) The following quote is from Zur Genealogie der Moral, II,3):

   [D]as Steinigen ( — schon die Sage lässt den Mühlstein auf das Haupt des Schuldigen fallen), das Rädern (die eigenste Erfindung und Spezialität des deutschen Genius im Reich der Strafe!), das Werfen mit dem Pfahle, das Zerreissen- oder Zertretenlassen durch Pferde (das „Viertheilen“), das Sieden des Verbrechers in Öl oder Wein (noch im vierzehnten und fünfzehnten Jahrhundert), das beliebte Schinden („Riemenschneiden“), das Herausschneiden des Fleisches aus der Brust; auch wohl dass man den Übelthäter mit Honig bestrich und bei brennender Sonne den Fliegen überliess. Mit Hülfe solcher Bilder und Vorgänge behält man endlich fünf, sechs „ich will nicht“ im Gedächtnisse, in Bezug auf welche man sein Versprechen gegeben hat, um unter den Vortheilen der Societät zu leben, — und wirklich! mit Hülfe dieser Art von Gedächtniss kam man endlich „zur Vernunft“! — Ah, die Vernunft, der Ernst, die Herrschaft über die Affekte, diese ganze düstere Sache, welche Nachdenken heisst, alle diese Vorrechte und Prunkstücke des Menschen: wie theuer haben sie sich bezahlt gemacht! wie viel Blut und Grausen ist auf dem Grunde aller „guten Dinge“!…

   Spinoza is not too different here, in that for him we are exposed to an overwhelming multiplicity of singularities which are abstracted through repetition into empty Universals and transcendental ideas, unless we come to properly understand [their/our] genesis, that is, the sense in which something comes to be, exists, and affects us in certain ways – and this depends both on our own and the external bodies’ constitutions (affectivity is not one way for Spinoza).

   Anyway, to take Spinoza’s advice, as I have already discussed this a lot this week, I will stop now before I provoke the reader’s disgust – I hope I haven’t done that already!

   Thank you all again for your excellent comments and criticisms on Tuesday – and for some nice defences when I was inadequate to the task. I look forward to the next meeting on the last parts of the Ethics with Jon.

   Cheers,

   Stuart.

   25 september 2008, 6:44 pm

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